Whether an individual becomes a party to judicial proceeding involuntarily, as a criminal or civil defendant, or voluntarily, as a civil plaintiff seeking redress of an injury, the assistance of counsel will increase his chances for a favorable disposition. When an impecunious litigant is unable to retain counsel, the question arises of who must bear the burden created by the complexity of adjudication. Although the Supreme Court has been sympathetic to the need for counsel in criminal cases,' an indigent litigant in civil cases often will be denied legal assistance, and therefore will bear the burden himself. 2 In other instances, the public will assume this burden by procuring and compensating attorneys or public defenders to represent litigants who cannot afford counsel.' Finally, members of the legal profession themselves may be required to carry this burden by representing the poor without compensation upon court appointment. ' The alternative that places the cost of representing impecunious litigants upon individual attorneys, rather than upon the public or upon the litigants themselves, might at first glance seem the least equitable. Such a system runs contrary to general expectations that professionals be compensated for their services. 5 However, American courts have long exercised the authority, at least in criminal cases, to compel attorneys to donate their services. 6 Recent constitutional challenges to this practice generally have been rejected, based either upon the broad licensing authority of the states or upon the unique relationship of attorneys to the courts. 7 This Note considers the constitutionality of requiring attorneys to provide uncompensated legal assistance. While the discussion centers upon court appointment of attorneys in civil cases, the analysis is also applicable to criminal cases. First, the Note outlines the demand for legal assistance to the poor and the types of constitutional challenges usually raised to compelled representation. The Note then examines the power of courts to compel attorneys to provide gratuitous legal services, analyzing the traditional justifications advanced by courts to shield compelled representation from constitutional scrutiny. Finding these justifications unpersuasive, the Note proceeds to examine the consitutional challenges to court appointment of attorneys, concluding that there is no constitutional bar to compelling attorneys to render uncompensated legal assistance to poor litigants in civil cases.
authorized courts to provide counsel at the request of indigents charged with capital crimes.' 0 By the late nineteenth century most state courts had ceased to depend on statutory authority, exercising the power to appoint counsel as part of their inherent or constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law within the state." Appointments during this period were still generally limited to criminal cases in which the defendant faced a serious penalty. 2 In recent years the need for legal representation for the poor has increased. Growing recognition of the importance of legal representation to obtaining a fair outcome in criminal cases, 3 culminating in the Supreme Court's announcement of a constitutional right to counsel in criminal prosecutions," has resulted in greater demands upon lawyers' time. An increasing rate of criminal activity '" and the requirement of representation at a greater number of stages of the criminal justice process ' 6 have also contributed to this burden. In civil cases as well 
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Others have attempted to force legislative action by relieving attorneys of their obligation to accept uncompensated court appointments." 0 Some courts, however, have continued to appoint attorneys without compensation in both criminal and civil cases. 2 In addition, several proposals have recently been advanced to compel members of the bar to devote a minimum number of hours to public service such as the representation of impecunious clients. 22 490 (Nev. 1976 ).
An exercise of inherent judicial power to compel legislative compensation of appointed attorneys would seem the most satisfactory solution from the point of view of indigent litigants. Indigent litigants would gain access to legal assistance not only when constitutionally or statutorily required, but whenever the court deems it required by fairness. See Caston v. Sears. Roebuck & Co.. 556 F.2d 1305, 1308-10 (5th Cir. 1977) (guidelines for appointment of counsel in civil rights cases).
Courts finding no inherent power to compensate attorneys or unwilling to exercise their inherent power have given broad interpretations to statutes authorizing payment of expenses incident to judicial administration so as to find statutory authorization for the compensation of appointed attorneys. See By refusing to compel representation upon court appointment, courts shift to legislatures the burden of developing and financing a system for providing legal services to indigent criminal defendants whose right to counsel is of constitutional dimension. Without counsel or an effective waiver of counsel, the defendant's conviction would be constitutionally defective; therefore, the legislature is put to the choice of either financing legal representation or precluding the state from prosecuting criminal cases. See Johnson v. City Comm'n, 272 N.W.2d 97, 101 (S.D. 1978). On the other hand, the legislature is not compelled to finance legal assistance for indigents to whom there is no constitutional guarantee of counsel. Therefore, indigent litigants in civil cases may be denied assistance absent the largesse of the legislature or of private attorneys. proposals would have the same force as court appointments," and would impose still more compulsory service requirements upon attorneys. Lawyers have never passively accepted judicial directives to represent clients without compensation. Since the mid-nineteenth century, attorneys have raised constitutional challenges to court appointments. 4 Until recently, however, such challenges were almost always rejected., While conceding that a state generally cannot compel uncompensated personal service from individuals in the community,' early decisions distinguished legal representation from other types of personal service. Representation of indigents was viewed alternatively as a duty that could logically be imposed on attorneys as "officers of the court" tional grounds, but also under federal antitrust law. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Statutory challenges to compulsory gratuitous legal assistance fall outside the scope of this Note.
23. For example, the New York City Bar Proposal, supra note 22, at 22-25, would be implemented by the adoption of a Disciplinary Rule in each Appellate Division, upon the recommendation of the Bar. The Rule would provide that "[elvery lawyer shall devote a significant portion of his or her professional time each year to public service practice." Id. at 23.
24. Generally lawyers claimed that their services could not be taken without compensation. See Hall v. Washington, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850).
Early decisions also considered claims for compensation based on an implied or quasicontractual relationship between the attorney and the state or local government. For example, in Whicher v. Cedar County, I Greene 217 (Iowa 1848), an Iowa attorney assigned under a state statute to represent an indigent criminal defendant sued the county for remuneration. The attorney argued that as an "officer of the court" he was not free to refuse the court's assignment, but that the obligation to preserve the life and liberty of indigents by assuring them a defense in criminal cases attached to the community at large, which must therefore compensate members of the bar for their services. A majority of the court denied compensation, however, adopting the county's argument that the statute authorizing an appointment of counsel to indigent defendants did not impose a duty on any member of the bar to accept the appointment, but relied upon an attorney to serve either gratuitously as a "friend of the court" or with the hope of recovering his fee from the defendant. Therefore, attorneys had no right to be reimbursed for their services in the absence of a statute providing for compensation.
See also Bacon v. 
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UNCOMPENSATED ASSISTANCE subject to the court's authority; 27 an historically recognized obligation to which attorneys impliedly consent upon accepting the license to practice law; 2 8 or a duty correlative to reciprocal rights and privileges conferred on licensed attorneys.
9
In recent years the increase in compulsory legal service has precipitated a renewal of constitutional challenges to the obligation to represent the poor.
30
Most courts continue to reject constitutional challenges to court assignments, relying on the century-old conception of the peculiar status of legal representation.
3 For example, in United States v. Dillon, 32 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the appointment of an attorney against a constitutional challenge because the attorney "performs an obligation imposed upon him by the ancient traditions of his profession and as an officer of the court assisting the court in the administration of justice." 33 The court considered the duty to accept an appointment to be "a condition under which lawyers are licensed to practice" and to which "[a]n applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed [ 38 a New York state trial court found that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the imposition on the right to practice law of conditions not reasonably related to an attorney's fitness to practice law. The court held that a court appointment of a lawyer to render gratuitous service to indigent litigants in a divorce action did not meet this test and was therefore unconstitutional.
39
Most recently, in Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings,' a federal district court in Alabama declined to assign counsel to civil rights plaintiffs on the ground that appointment of counsel in civil cases imposes upon the attorney an involuntary servitude prohibited by the thirteenth amendment. In the court's view, an obligation to represent indigent civil litigants, unlike the duty to defend indigents in criminal cases, did not fall within any exception to the thirteenth amendment prohibition because it was neither an obligation undertaken commensurate with the privilege to practice law nor was it a duty owed to the state."
Before evaluating these constitutional challenges, the Note discusses the power of courts to appoint attorneys to represent indigents in civil cases.
I. JUDICIAL POWER TO COMPEL GRATurrous REPRESENTATION BY ATrORNEYS
It has long been recognized that the states possess broad authority to regulate the legal profession because "lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice." 42 The breadth of this power is apparent in the wide sweep of the American Bar Association's Code of Profes- The appointment of counsel in both civil and criminal cases furthers the administration of justice by enhancing the fairness of judicial proceedings. 53 Therefore, it is within the state's broad power. This view is supported by many decisions invoking the courts' regulatory authority to justify the appointment of counsel -and by several statutes permitting appointment of counsel.
5
State regulation of attorneys, like all state regulatory power, is subject to limits imposed by the federal constitution.
5 6 Many courts, however, have found appointments of attorneys to represent indigents immune from constitutional scrutiny, either because attorneys are "officers of the court" obligated to serve upon court appointment or because such a condition may permissibly be imposed upon the attorney's license to practice law. Analysis of the two doctrines indicates that they cannot be invoked to override constitutional prohibitions. Government power over attorneys is limited by applicable constitutional requirements.
A. "Officer of the Court"
The modern American attorney is often described as an "officer of the court." 57 Many courts have relied upon this status in requiring attorneys to 43 53. There is no basis for distinguishing appointments in criminal cases from those in civil cases. In each situation, the fairness of the proceeding is promoted by the involvement of the attorney.
54. See note 21 supra. 
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW carry out court appointments. 8 In their view, lawyers may permissibly be subject to an otherwise unconstitutional burden because of the courts' supervisory authority. An examination of the officer of the court doctrine, however, indicates that it is not applicable to American attorneys.
In the English legal system lawyers were classified as either "attorneys" or "barristers." Attorneys, who were not permitted to plead and defend suits for clients, were considered officers of the court. Attorneys performed ministerial duties for the courts, were admitted to practice by a judge, and were subject to the judge's discipline, just as were members of the court clerical staff. 5 9 In contrast, English barristers, who pleaded and defended lawsuits, were admitted to practice by self-regulating professional organizations, the Inns of Court."
They were never considered officers of the court." Banisters were obligated to accept court appointments to represent the poor 62 because they were required, as citizens, to defer to the commands of the King's courts, not because of their relationship to the courts. 3 Clearly the officer of the court doctrine cannot be used to support courtcompelled representation by American lawyers. The doctrine did not apply to banisters, the English lawyers who most closely resemble American litigators, and it was never used to support compelled legal representation. The inapplicability of this doctrine to American attorneys is bolstered by the position of lawyers in the early American legal system.
The early practice of law in this country was characterized by low standards for admission and by scant judicial control over practitioners. Lawyers in the 60. The organization of a guild of sergeants-of-law, the precursors of barristers, developed during the fourteenth century. Selected by the chief justice of the Common Pleas, the sergeants were commanded to serve by the chancellor under the threat of heavy penalty, and could only be discharged by special royal writ. In addition to lucrative fees and a monopoly of practice at the Court of Common Pleas, the sergeants enjoyed rank equal with knights, freedom from suit except in their own court, and privileges to levy fines, attend Parliament, and try petitions. [Vol. 81:366 UNCOMPENSATED ASSISTANCE tionship to the judiciary associated with attorneys in England.' The elevation of law to its professional status after the Civil War resulted not from the courts' assumption of regulatory power over lawyers, but from the emergence of selfregulating bar associations nationwide. 6 " Thus the close relationship between lawyer and court, which had been at the root of the English concept of an "officer of the court," was never present in the United States.
Contemporary judicial decisions, while repeatedly describing attorneys as officers of the court, also recognize that the British model can not properly be applied to the American legal system. For example, in In re Griffiths,' the Supreme Court rejected the argument that because of the status of attorneys as officers of the court citizenship could be made a condition of admission to the bar. The Court found that the position of lawyers is not like that of clerks, marshals, bailiffs, or other public officials under the courts' supervision-the position of officers of the court in Britain. Therefore, the Griffiths Court found no reason to consider whether a citizenship requirement could constitutionally be imposed upon public officials. 67 American lawyers are instead viewed as functioning "in a three-fold capacity, as self-employed businessmen .... as trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solution to disputes." 6 The courts have thus drawn a distinction between lawyers and the ministerial agents of the judiciary who are officers of the court,' rendering 64. Although formally receiving the English common law, the Colonies departed radically from the English tradition in structuring legal services. See generally R. Pound., The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modem Times (1953) . Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries legislation hostile to the practice of law was enacted in the Colonies. When the Colonies did establish systems of admission to the practice of law in the early eighteenth century, most rejected the traditional English system by which each court admitted attorneys to practice before it. Instead, an attorney admitted by a court or by the royal governor was permitted to practice before any of the courts of the colony.
Whatever continuity existed between the legal profession in the colonies and its English counterpart dissolved after the American revolution. Decentralization and deprofessionalization of the practice of law was characterized by low standards for admission to practice. See, e.g., Mass. Act of March 6, 1790, 1 Laws of Massachusetts 1780-1807 at 493. Lack of judicial control over legal practitioners resulted from the combined effects of political hostility toward English institutions, geographical and economic conditions after the war, and a Jeffersonian distrust of professionalism as antithetical to democratic ideals. The independent professional status of attorneys was abolished in many states by the mid-nineteenth century. See 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW the officer of the court doctrine inapplicable to American attorneys. The doctrine therefore cannot be used to uphold the authority of the judiciary to impose otherwise unconstitutional burdens upon attorneys.
B. Conditions on Occupational Licensing
Courts have also upheld the obligation to accept court appointments as a condition permissibly imposed upon the attorney's license to practice law. 70 In this view, the practice of a profession is a privilege granted by the state, which the state is under no obligation to bestow and which therefore may be unilaterally revoked. A license to practice law may be lawfully withheld by the state except upon the conditions it imposes, including conditions that would otherwise violate the constitutional rights of attorneys. Therefore, the duty to represent indigents, or any other obligation, could permissibly be imposed upon lawyers.
The notion that access to government benefits may be conditioned upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights was dominant during the nineteenth century,' when the issue of the constitutionality of court appointment of attorneys first arose. In the past two decades, however, it has been soundly rejected by the Supreme Court.
Recalling 8 a New York attorney was disbarred for failing to cooperate with a judicial inquiry. Petitioner challenged his disbarment for professional misconduct on the ground that his failure to produce financial records and to testify was an exercise of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The Court upheld his challenge, reasoning that the government's power to license attorneys does not carry with it the power to deny or to limit their fifth amendment rights."
Conditions on the license to practice law have also been struck down when inconsistent with due process, 78 with the first amendment rights of free speech 79 or free association,' or with the right to equal protection.' These cases establish the clear principle that the license to practice law may not be conditioned on an attorney's relinquishment of constitutional rights.
II. CONsTrruTONAL CHALLENGES TO COMPELLED REPRESENTATION

A. Due Process
The precipitous decline of substantive due process since the 1930's has had its greatest impact on federal judicial review of state regulation of businesses and professions.
8 2 Although state laws in the economics area were formerly subject to intense scrutiny under the due process clause," it is now "enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."" Of course, the evil sought to be corrected or the goal sought to be advanced must be a proper object of state legislation. 
385 U.S. 511 (1967).
77. Id. at 516 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 520 (Fortas, J., concurring) 87 the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a requirement that all lawyers practicing in Wisconsin pay annual dues to the state bar. While focusing for the most part on plaintiff's claim that his right of free association had been infringed, the Court did note that the dues requirement satisfied due process inasmuch as it had a reasonable relationship to the legitimate state policy of improving legal services.8
Under this standard, court appointment of attorneys to represent indigents without compensation should be upheld against a due process challenge. The appointments seek to further a policy of improving legal services to the poor. This is certainly a legitimate state policy; it is basically the same one endorsed in Lathrop. 9 The means of achieving the goal is also reasonable: the court acts directly to provide legal services to the poor. Thus the court's conclusion in Menin v. Menin ' that due process forbids the appointment of attorneys in civil cases is contrary to the applicable precedents.
B. Involuntary Servitude
The thirteenth amendment 9' bars both "slavery" and "involuntary servitude" within the United States. In addition to this self-executing prohibition, the 86. The due process clause does impose more substantial constraints upon the criteria that a state may use in regulating admission to the bar. The Supreme Court has stated that "any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." . The attorney's obligation to accept court appointments, however, is not a condition upon his admission to the bar; rather, it is a regulation of the practice of law, and the less stringent due process test applies.
Even under the stricter standard, court compelled representation arguably satisfies due process. Public-spiritedness has traditionally been considered an element of the good moral character necessary to practice law. A requirement of public interest is embodied in various provisions of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Canon 2 (The profession has a "duty to make legal counsel available."); Ethical Consideration 2-25 ("Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find the time to participate in serving the disadvantaged."); Canon 8 (Every lawyer "should assist in improving the legal system.").
That a lawyer's insensitivity to the public interest might justify the revocation of a license to practice was suggested by Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), which upheld the disbarment of an attorney for declining to answer questions advanced by a New York court investigating professional misconduct. Justice Harlan emphasized that a duty to cooperate in an investigation into professional malfeasance is "rationally" related to the state interest, justified by the exposure of attorneys to "special opportunities for deleterious conduct," in "preventive certainty" regarding the ethical conduct of members of the bar. Id. at 126-27. He suggested in addition, however, that an attorney should be interested both in the effective functioning of the judicial process and in the public standing of the legal profession, so that a lawyer's failure to cooperate in an investigation into professional misconduct might reflect an absence of the degree of concern for judicial administration that the state may reasonably require of its attorneys. Although the amendment was ratified during the Civil War with the object of abolishing slavery, 9 3 the scope of Congress's enforcement power has been interpreted in recent years to encompass a broad range of discriminatory activities.
9
In contrast, the amendment's self-executing prohibition has been limited in its application by the Supreme Court to instances in which state criminal statutes create a risk of imprisonment for breach of an employment contract.
5 Under this construction of the thirteenth amendment, it seems unlikely that court appointment of attorneys would be undermined. The attorney who refuses to represent an indigent risks losing only his right to practice law; he is not threatened with prison. indigent civil rights plaintiffs as the creation of an involuntary servitude. The correctness of this conclusion, however, is doubtful.
Traditionally, courts faced with the question of whether service was "involuntary" have looked to the threatened consequences of a refusal to serve,1°°r ather than to the voluntariness of the initial agreement to work ' 0 or to the actual mental state of the servitor at the time of service. 0 , The possibility of civil damages for breach of an employment contract is not so harsh as to render a performance of labor involuntary; in contrast, labor is involuntary when, as in the case,of peonage, "law or force compels performance." 101 In rare instances courts have been required to decide whether threatened consequences of a refusal to provide services short of force or confinement are coercive enough to render a servitude "involuntary."
In United States v. Shackney 104 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was asked to decide whether labor performed under threat of deportation was involuntary. Shackney, a chicken farmer, was charged under a federal criminal statute with subjecting Mexican employees to involuntary servitude by threatening to have them deported if they refused to work. 0 5 The government argued that involuntary servitude included any willful procurement of services by duress. The government's interpretation would have barred employment under threats to blackball an employee in the industry, to reveal a crime to the police, or even to prevent the employee's son from obtaining admission to a desirable college.101 The court rejected the government's broad reading, and held that "the statute applies only to service compelled by law, by force or by threat of continued confinement." 101 Therefore, the threat of deportation, at least where the employee did not anticipate violence or confinement upon return to the country of his origin, was not sufficiently coercive to make labor "involuntary" for the purposes of the Federal criminal statute.
Under the Second Circuit's reading, the threatened loss of employment opportunities similarly would not render a servitude involuntary. Thus, in Flood v. Kuhn 's the court relied on Shackney, holding that the baseball reserve system did not establish an involuntary servitude, inasmuch as an employee constrained by the system was free to abandon his profession as a baseball player and to seek or accept other employment. Under Shackney and Flood, the threatened loss of the license to practice law would not make acceptance of court appointments involuntary; an attorney remains free to abandon the practice of law without risking imprisonment or bodily harm. Therefore, an attorney's compelled representation of poor litigants cannot be characterized as an involuntary servitude.
Even if denominated an involuntary servitude, an attorney's duty to serve court-assigned clients probably falls within the "public service" exception to the thirteenth amendment. Under this exception,' 9 the government may compel citizens to render a public service, even when the compulsion amounts to involuntary servitude. Thus in the Selective Draft Law Cases "I the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the thirteenth amendment was not intended "to destroy the power of the Government to compel a citizen to render public service." On this theory, the Court has upheld military conscription,"' the incarceration of material witnesses,"' a Florida statute requiring able-bodied men to labor on public roads without compensation," 3 and a Michigan statute forbidding public officers to relinquish their positions without the consent of the state."' This exception to the prohibition of involuntary servitude would allow a state to demand virtually any public service of its citizens, although the scope of "public service" may be reasonably limited to services in areas of traditional concern to the state." ' The state could thereby compel its residents to serve in such areas as police protection, sanitation, public health, and education, but perhaps not in the commercial 
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The Supreme Court has made clear that it regards representation of indigents by court-appointed attorneys, at least in criminal cases, to be the performance of a public service." 7 It has been argued that the representation of civil litigants, on the other hand, entails only a private service. Proponents of this position point to the public values at issue in criminal proceedings as opposed to the private rights pressed in civil suits, and note that the states are under no obligation to provide counsel to civil litigants comparable to their constitutional mandate to provide legal assistance to indigent criminal defendants. "' But the state interest necessary to justify compulsion of public service need not be of constitutional dimension." ' 9 Regardless of the nature of the case, the substantial state interest in assuring fairness in the administration of justice 120 would justify the states in providing legal assistance to litigants. 2 The existence of state and federally funded programs to provide legal assistance to the poor in civil cases "2 affirms that such assistance serves a public purpose. If it did not, such expenditures would be improper exercises of governmental spending powers.,2 held, however, that the scope of their servitude could not exceed the societal interests that make the incarceration necessary. Although work that was reasonably related to a therapeutic program or normal housekeeping chores would fall within the confines of the exception, mandatory programs devoid of therapeutic purpose, because of the amount of work demanded or the conditions under which the work was performed, would be unconstitutional as an involuntary servitude. Jobson suggests that the state should not be permitted to disregard the personal liberty and integrity of its citizens by making demands upon their services unrelated to the attainment of the state interest. A state may reasonably determine that adjudicative complexity, although not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, impedes the access of uncounselled indigents to expeditious resolution of civil disputes. The resultant state interest in providing attorneys to impecunious litigants in civil suits will not be diminished in the case of a plaintiff who voluntarily comes into court, inasmuch as his inability to redress an injury causes an involuntary loss equal to that of a civil defendant who is unable effectively to protect his interests in court. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964) .
121. An affirmative finding that assistance of counsel will advance the fairness of the proceeding might be necessary, at least in civil cases, to ensure the applicability of the public service exception. See note 116 supra.
122. [Vol. 81:366
UNCOMPENSATED ASSISTANCE C. Uncompensated Taking of Private Property
The fifth amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." 124 The principle behind this restriction is that the government may not require a small number of individuals to bear costs that properly ought to be assumed by the public as a whole.' z Although this principle antedates the Constitution,'" no clear-cut test has yet been formulated to determine whether government action affecting private property is a compensable taking. 12 7 Once it is shown that government action interferes with interests in private property '1 without the claimant's consent," courts undertake an ad hoc consideration of factors that have traditionally been deemed relevant to the takings question.' 129. See, e.g., Kunhardt & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 537, 540 (1925) (no "taking" of vessel when in order to comply with the demands of government officials that it deliver goods in accordance with its sales contract, claimant was forced to forego a profitable disposition of a vessel it owned).
The rationale that "takings" to which the claimant has consented require no compensation has been applied to deny compensation "for the performance of a public duty [ 
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW but instead lowers the value of property by prohibiting particular present or contemplated uses, so as to frustrate investment-backed expectations, compensation may also be required 3 2 However, restrictions on the use of property often need not be compensated, on the theory that the claimant retained a reciprocal benefit,"' that the restriction did not have an unduly harsh impact,'" or that the desired use of property would destroy or be inconsistent with the use of neighboring properties. concluded that even if personal labor can be considered "property" for purposes of the takings provision, compelled labor on the public roads would not be com- In characterizing government action, "takings" jurisprudence does not divide a particular prop. erty into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated, but rather focuses on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the property as a whole. As a result, laws that impose a servitude by restricting the development of air rights or prohibiting the subjacent or lateral development of particular parcels have not been characterized as a physical acquisition of air, subjacent, or lateral rights. Penn Cent. Transp But if a court chooses to summon an expert witness, the expert's services must be compensated under the fifth amendment, because they are not a previously owed public duty.1" Once personal services are acknowledged to be property, the more complex task remains to adapt traditional takings analysis to cases of government interference with the private allocation of personal services.
The distinction between compensable "takings" and noncompensable "regulations" may be applied to interference with labor.' For instance, criminal prohibitions of such acts as theft or assault, or civil wage and hour limitations, are not "takings" but "regulations," which restrict socially undesireable uses of one's services. ' On the other hand, the requirement in Butler that able-bodied men work on the public roads or the obligation of attorneys to represent indigents at trial constitute an affirmative appropriation of property of the type that traditionally compels compensation.' 153. The requirement that an individual labor on behalf of the public would seem best characterized as a temporary appropriation and use of personal services. See note 131 and accompanying text supra. It may nevertheless be argued that the alternative civil sanction results in the establishment of a "use restriction" rather than a physical acquisition of property, because the indi-[Vol. 81:366
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The substantial public purpose promoted by the services appropriated in such cases as Butler and Hurtado would not in itself have been enough to justify a denial of compensation, in the absence of an historical obligation that supplanted the fifth amendment. 54 The appropriation of services in either case, however, could have been justified under traditional takings analysis, even though government actions involved an affirmative acquisition of property, rather than a restriction of undesirable uses. In each case the burdens and benefits of the appropriated services were equitably distributed; there was "an average reciprocity of advantage." "I The road labor exacted in Butler furthered a legitimate public interest in transportation, and all who labored would ultimately benefit from access to the roads; the work was divided evenly among members of the public, rather than allocated to a select class; and the six days of work demanded each year did not substantially frustrate any individual's economic interest in his own labor. Similarly, the requirement in Hurtado that residents appear as witnesses for negligible compensation promoted the public interest in the administration of justice, and gave rise to a reciprocal right to call upon others to appear as witnesses in one's own trial. Furthermore, the obligation fell equally upon all residents and did not create an excessive economic hardship.
In contrast, in cases of disinterested expert witnesses compelled to testify at trial, there is no reciprocal benefit to offset the burden imposed. The obligation does not fall equally on all citizens, but applies only to a select segment of society. Moreover, the professional suffers the frustration of economic expectations derived from his or her prior investment in special education and training.' 56 Therefore, an appropriation of personal services of this kind, directed at a particular class of professionals, would require compensation under an ad hoc takings approach.
57
vidual is "restricted" from rendering particular services absent a corresponding willingness to donate his labor. However, a restriction imposed as a coercive device by the government in order to acquire property cannot properly be deemed a regulation when the limitation is placed upon a desirable, rather than an undesirable, use of property. See note 135 and accompanying text supra. See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 38 (1964) . When the state requires that a professional donate services as a condition of his right to render identical services for compensation, it acknowledges that those services are socially beneficial, and therefore not legitimately prohibited as an exercise of the power to regulate for the public welfare. 154. Although a considerable number of takings cases deny compensation largely on the ground of the extent of the public purpose served by challenged government action, these cases generally consider action in the nature of a restriction on the use of property. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978) . The distinction between affirmative appropriations and prohibitions that affect economic values may be rationalized on the basis that in the former cases the government acts in an enterprise capacity appropriating property for a strictly governmental purpose, while in the latter case, the government simple arbitrates between conflicting private uses. See id. at 135 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)); L. Tribe, supra note 82, § 9-5, at 464 & n.8. Were the mere presence of a legitimate purpose sufficient in itself to deny compensation, little if any force would remain to the guarantee of just compensation, inasmuch as any government interference with property is required to serve a public purpose. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) .
155. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (opinion of Holmes, J.). 156. Investment-backed expectations will be frustrated to a lesser degree, however, when the state previously subsidized the cost of an individual's professional education.
157. The case in which an individual is called upon to render professional services incidental to the fulfillment of a military obligation can be distinguished. In such a case the obligation to serve is spread out among the citizenry.
